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PROLEGOMENON TO A STUDY OF POLICE POWERS
IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Leonard H. Leigh*
I. Introduction
Historically, the official functions of the police can be described quite briefly.
The original instructions to the Metropolitan Police provided:
The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime; the
next that of detection and punishment of offenders, if crime is committed.
To these ends all the efforts of the police must be directed. The protection
of life and property, the preservation of public tranquillity, and the absence
of crime will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful and
whether the objects for which the police were appointed have been ob-
tained.'
It scarcely requires reflection for the modem observer to conclude that this
description of police functions is today quite inadequate. In addition to the
functions noted above, the Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police
of 1962 points out that the police have a duty to control traffic, to advise local
authorities on traffic questions, to conduct inquiries for other government de-
partments, and to provide assistance in emergencies. Over and above these
duties, the police, as the Royal Commission noted, have a long tradition of
rendering public assistance.'
Yet this recital of the duties of the police does not precisely depict their role.
It fails, for example, to take adequate notice of the vital element of discretion
which the police exercise in fulfilling their duties and which, in effect, tends
to shape the whole system. Thus, the creative functions which the exercise of
discretion can serve, and the tensions and ambiguities which such exercise can
produce, are alike ignored. Some of the creative functions exercised upon a basis
of discretion relate to traditional police work. Others are only related to tradi-
tional functions in an indirect and, in some cases, a tenuous fashion. For ex-
ample, it has been said by a senior police officer that the police service must fol-
low the path into a social role. The police must:
... become one of the instruments of government woven into the fabric
of the welfare state, giving a helping hand to youth and succour to the
adult and elderly.3
* Reader in Law, The University of London; B. A. 1957, University of Alberta; LL.B.,
1958, University of Alberta; Ph.D., 1966, University of London.
1 SIR J. MOYLAN, SCOTLAND YARD 40 (1929). There is even today no statute imposing
general duties of law enforcement upon the police.
2 CmND. No. 1728, para. 59; see also Haynes v. Harwood, [1935] 1 K.B. 146, 162 (C.A.
1934).
3 Sir Eric St. Johnson, then H.M. Chief Inspector of Constabulary cited in Dear,
Coloured Immigrant Communities and the Police, 45 PoLies JoURNAL 128-150 (1972). For
accounts of police work with juveniles, see Osborough, Police Discretion Not to Prosecute
juveniles, 28 M.L.R. 421 (1965).
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The adaptation of the police to this role can be seen in the area of race
relations. The police may not be the immigrant's first point of contact with
society, but they are a principal point of contact. The peaceful assimilation of an
immigrant community may depend upon the wise exercise by the police of their
powers. Thus it has been said:
Certainly the police must respond to the challenge for, whilst we are not
alone in being challenged by the various demands of a multi-racial society,
the consequences of our not responding are uniquely serious.4
This entire area is debatable. What discretion have the police in relation
to law enforcement; in the light of what principles ought it be exercised; what
controls exist over the exercise of discretion; and by whom are the controls exer-
cised? Further, what functions do we wish the police to perform and how are
their powers and the conditions of their exercise related to the performance of
these functions? These questions relate to problems which are pervasive, and
which exist not of course in England and Wales alone. Investigation into these
problems in the United States is well advanced.5 This article represents an
attempt to put police powers in England and Wales into a constitutional con-
text, to indicate the stages at which the police may exercise legal powers, to
say something about the use of discretion in the exercise of such powers, and
finally to say something about the control of the police-the problem of account-
ability in a system which, in many ways, is unique. It is not the first attempt
to do so. It will certainly not be the last.6
II. The Structure and Organization of the Police
The scope of this article does not encompass the history of the English
police. A number of studies of police history exist.' Some part of the history,
however, explains certain aspects of modem law relating to the status of the
police. The basic powers of the modem police officer flow from his status as a
constable, and not from his membership in a police force. Indeed, certain mem-
bers of police forces such as police cadets are not invested with the full panoply
of police powers.' A constable is a person invested by lawful authority, with
powers to keep the peace. He need not belong to a defined force. The constable,
while appointed locally and answerable to the justices of the peace, was originally
4 Dear, supra note 3, at 144. See also J. LAMBERT, CRIME, POLICE AND RACE RELATIONS
ch. 6 (1970); Banton, Role of the Police in a Changing Society, The Times (London), Sep. 8,
1970, at 3, col. 3.
5 Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427 '(1960); La
Fave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law, (1962) Wis. L. REv. 104 and 179; Kadish,
Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process, 75 HAgv. L. REV. 914
(1962).
6 The leading account is G. MARSHALL, POLICE AND GOVERNMENT (1965). See also
J. LAMBERT, supra note 4.
7 In particular, see T. A. CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY 01 THE POLICE IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 900-1966 (1967); for a short account, J. Tobias, Origins of the Police Role, 4 THE
CRIMINOLOGIST, 106-112 (1969).
8 Police Act 1964, §§ 17(1), 18, 19(1).
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regarded as holding office under the Crown. 9 He was not, historically, a mem-
ber of a formed body. Professor Maitland indeed concluded that the first police
force in the United Kingdom was not created until 1786, in Dublin." The
constable's duties were wide, but his powers were limited. He was supervised
by the justices who, until the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848, took a much
wider initiating role in the administration of criminal justice than do their
modem counterparts. The constable's powers were not much greater than those
of the ordinary citizen. He had somewhat more extensive powers of arrest,
being authorized to arrest in cases of suspected felony." He enjoyed no great
immunities by law, though he was protected in the execution of a justice's war-
rant.'
2
When police forces were created, the powers enjoyed by police constables
were, naturally, those which inhered in the office of constable together with such
further powers as might from time to time be conferred upon constables by
statute. The focus of supervision changed. It became more immediate. It was
henceforth exercised by a hierarchy controlling a disciplined force. The general
structure of constabulary powers did not change. No enlargement occurred.
The dangers inherent in organized bodies of police were foreseeable and, in some
quarters, the dangers were more clearly perceived than the benefits to be derived
therefrom.'
The growth of police forces has been considered elsewhere.' 4 In England
the Metropolitan Police Act was passed in 1829. The City of London police
force was established in 1839. Provision was made for creation of police forces
in the towns in 1835 and in the counties in 1839." Gradually, organized forces
extended throughout county and borough areas. Police forces grew up on a
local basis. Some forces were large; others were very small. But although forces
were raised locally and were in theory responsible to local bodies (the Watch
Committee in the borough and the Standing Joint Committee in the county),
they were never under the operational control of bodies consisting of local
elected representatives.' Furthermore, the Home Secretary began to intervene
9 See Stat. Winchester, 13 Edw. 1 c.2, § 6; Canals Offences Act 1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c.
50, § 1, Vin. Abr. vol. 5 tit. Constable 1. "The Constable is the keeper of the peace, that is
to say, the high constable for the hundred, and the petty constable in the town," Rex v. Wyatt,
[1705] 2 Ld. Raym. 1189. For a similar American definition, see Commonwealth u. Deacon,
8 S. & R. 47, 49 (Pa. 1822).
10 F. W. MAITLAND, JUSTICE AND POLICE 108 (1885).
11 See Walters v. W. H. Smith & Son Ltd. [1914] 1 K.B. 595 (1913), 83 L.J.K.B. (n.s.)
335. For present law, see Criminal Law Act 1967, c.58, § 2(4).
12 Constables Protection Act 1750, 24 Geo. 2, c.44, § 6.
13 Thus a Parliamentary Committee Report, cited in T. A. CRITCHLEY, supra note 7, at
47 concluded that:
It is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police, with that perfect freedom of
action and exemption from interference, which are the great privileges and blessings
of society in this country; and your Committee think that the forfeiture or curtailment
of such advantages would be too great a sacrifice for improvements in police, or
facilities in detection of crime, however desirable in themselves if abstractedly con-
sidered.
14 T. A. CRITCHLEY, supra note 7.
15 Id. at 62-100.
16 The courts took the position that policing was a national, and indeed it was said, an
Imperial function. Coomber v. Justices of Berks, [1883] 9 App. Cas. 61, 71. The opera-
tional autonomy of Chief Constables is stressed in Glasbrook Brothers Limited v. Glamorgan
County Council [1925] A.C. 270. Several decisions which hold that the constable is not a
[Vol. 48:861]
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more and more in their affairs in the interests of efficiency. Police funds were
made up in part from moneys provided by Parliament. Such funds were pro-
vided only for efficient forces, and a body of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Con-
stabulary grew up, charged with reporting to the Home Secretary on the effi-
ciency of local forces." In time these functions expanded to include such matters
as the ensuring of efficient collaboration among neighboring forces, the promo-
tion of coordinating machinery among them, and with the development of
services best handled within a district rather than by a single force.18 Many
aspects of police service were handled centrally. Even before the Police Act of
1964 which set the seal upon this development, an American writer could con-
clude that ". . . the functions of the Home Secretary may be limited, but his
powers are vast."' 9
The present constitutional framework within which the police exercise
their powers is composed of a number of elements."0 The external framework
discloses a system of responsibility which is shared between central and local
government, with the position of central government predominant.' In opera-
tional matters, control is vested in the Chief Constable whose authority is in-
dependent of central or local government control and, for the most part, of
Parliamentary scrutiny."5 It is possible for the Home Secretary to exercise cer-
tain ultimate controls such as requesting the resignation of a Chief Constable
or the initiation of a public inquiry-a step which sometimes follows represen-
tations by members of Parliament-but the invocation of such powers is rare."
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration cannot, at present, enter-
tain complaints against the police.24 External control is in addition to the
servant of the local authority or police authority derive from the same considerations. See also
Fisher v. Oldham Corporation [19301 2 K.B. 364; Lewis v. Cattle, [19381 2 K.B. 454. The
worst practical problem associated with this rule that a local authority was not liable for the
torts of constables was removed by Police Act 1964, c.48, § 48, rendering the Chief Constable
liable for the torts of constables under his direction and control.
17 T. A. CRITCHLEY, supra note 7, at 118-128.
18 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE POLICE, FINAL REPORT, CMND. NO. 172, paras. 245-46
(1962).
19 HEWITT, BRITISH POLICE ADMINISTRATION 61 (1965). For this we ought perhaps to
be grateful. Booth, Law Enforcement in Great Britain, 1969 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 407
remarks that the police are hampered by the government in such matters as the use of experi-
mental tear and nerve gases.
20 Some forces fall under special legislation. Thus the British Transport Police fall under
the Transport Acts 1962 and 1968, and airport police fall under the Airports Authority Act
1965.
21 Regan, The Police Service: An Extreme Example of Central Control over Local Author-
ity Staff, [1966] P.L. 13.
22 Wade, Note of the Constitutional Position of the Police, ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE
POLICE, CMND. No. 1728, appendix to Minutes of Evidence, Supplementary Evidence, at 28
(1962). See also Memorandum of Sir E. Fellowes, id., citing 529 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
col. 590 (1953-54).
23 See Police Act 1964, §§ 5(4) and 6(5). Public inquiries have been conducted into
several alleged cases of police brutality in recent years. For a relatively accessible example,
and a commentary thereon, see M. GRIG, THE CHALLONER CASE 1965.
24 Only in cases where the Home Secretary has power to call for an inquiry into a police
force under § 32 of the Police Act 1964 and has been guilty of maladministration in failing
to do so, can the Parliamentary Commissioner intervene and then only to determine whether
there was maladministration in failing to hold an inquiry. SECOND REPORT FROM THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR ADMINISTRATION, Session 1967-68
(H.C. 350).
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powers of the Home Secretary, to a degree, a matter for the courts, but their
intervention has been too sporadic to be of much effect.
A further, and to Americans, a most striking feature of the English criminal
process, is the absence of an independent system of prosecuting attorneys.25
There is a central government office, that of the Director of Public Prosecutions,
which is responsible for certain prosecutions (i.e., murder, any case referred
by a government department in which the Director considers that criminal
proceedings should be instituted, in certain cases in which a statute expressly
provides, and in cases the importance or difficulty of which renders his inter-
vention advisable in the public interest), and which must be notified of certain
other offenses (i.e., manslaughter, offenses where the statute requires the prosecu-
tion to be conducted by or with the consent of the Director, which includes cer-
tain sexual offenses, offenses relating to obscene publications, etc., and indictable
offenses the prosecutions of which were withdrawn or not proceeded with,
within a reasonable time). Offenses falling within this latter category are
usually dealt with at the local level by the Chief Constable. The Director of
Public Prosecutions handles few prosecutions, of the order of about 2,000
annually." Locally, many police forces can rely on the advice of a prosecuting
solicitor; though in actuality only thirty-two of forty-five police authorities in
England and Wales engage such assistance. Furthermore, such solicitors are
employed by the local police authority or the local authority, and therefore
lack complete independence. Prosecuting solicitors cannot exercise authority
over the police who are free to accept or reject the solicitor's advice.2  One
institutional check upon the exercise of police powers which is common in
America and other jurisdictions is therefore largely lacking in England and
Wales.
The same comments apparently apply in relation to the Metropolitan Police
for which the Home Secretary is the police authority. In R. v. Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn,8 Lord Denning, M. R., stated
categorically that the Commissioner is not subservient to the Home Secretary
in operational matters. His position in such matters is independent. It has been
argued, however, that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner stands in a different
relation to the Home Secretary as police authority than do local Chief Con-
stables to local police authorities.29 It is true that the Home Secretary answers
to Parliament for the Metropolitan Police and that he will inform the House of
Commons of action taken by the police and even whether such action con-
travened the rules normally followed by the force. 0 The situation is, however,
25 There is a system of prosecutors in Scotland. See Mitchell, Memorandum on the Con-
stitutional Position of the Police in Scotland, ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE POLICE, CmND. No.
1728, Minutes of Evidence, appendix 2, at 92-100 "(1962); The Prosecution Process in England
and Wales, JusTICE paras. 11-14 (London 1970).
26 See generally J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN ch. 17 (1964).
27 The Prosecution Process in England and Wales, supra note 25.
28 [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 (C.A.).
29 G. MARSHALL, supra note 6, at 29-32.
30 S.A. DE SmTH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADmINISTRATIVE. LAW 383 (1971). For an
example see 759 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) cols. 403-04 (1966-67) in which, following a
cause celebre, the Home Secretary outlined the practices followed by the Metropolitan Police
in ensuring that adequate grounds existed for applying for warrants in drug cases.
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ambiguous. Various Home Secretaries have stated that the Commissioner is
not independent of their authority. The Home Secretary, it is sometimes said,
,should be responsible for the policy of the police.31 The most recent statement
is that of Mr. (now Lord) Simon in 1957 who stated:
For the Metropolitan Police, it is a matter for the discretion of the Secre-
tary of State as to how far, in discharging the duties placed upon him by
Parliament, he should himself, through the Home Office, interfere with
the executive action which is the responsibility of the Commissioner. In
practice, in respect of administration and the maintenance of discipline,
it is the Secretary of State's sphere to prescribe and enforce general prin-
ciples, and the Commissioner's sphere to apply them to individual cases,
subject only to his general accountability to the Secretary of State as the
police authority. In matters of discipline it is also subject to the right of
appeal to the Secretary of State provided by the Police [Appeals] Acts.
32
In practice, therefore, the Home Secretary intervenes in the limited areas of
efficient administration and the maintenance of discipline. Whether he has
wider legal powers to direct the police in the performance of their duties is
doubtful, although much is in fact achieved by consultation. There is uncertainty
concerning with what executive action, proper to the Commissioner, the Home
Secretary may legally interfere.
The puzzle of the degree of supervision exercised by central authority is
not entirely resolved by a perusal of the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 which
authorized the creation of the force. This Act enabled His Majesty to establish
a police office in the City of Westminster. He could appoint two fit persons to
execute the duties of a justice of the peace at the office:
... together with such other duties as shall be herein-after specified or as
shall be from time to time directed by one of His Majesty's principal secre-
taries of state for the more efficient administration of the police within the
limits herein-after mentioned.3
Section 4 enables the Secretary of State to appoint constables, such constables to
obey the lawful commands of the justices. Section 5 enables the justices, sub-
ject to the approval of the Home Secretary, to make orders and regulations for
preventing neglect or abuse and for rendering the force efficient in the discharge
of its duties. It would appear that the oversight of the Home Secretary was to
operate in such areas as establishments, administration, and disciplinary regula-
tions, leaving the direction of policing, as such, in the hands of the justices,
otherwise known as the Commissioners (now referred to as the Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police). This would not have seemed unusual. At that
period the police were generally answerable to the justices who directed their
operations. The justices had a primary duty to ensure that the peace was kept."
31 G. MARSHALL, supra note 6, at 31, citing Sir W. Harcourt.
32 571 PARL. DFB., H. 0. (5th ser.) col. 574 '(1956-57).
33 Metropolitan Police Act 1829, § 1.
34 S. A. Da SMITH, supra note 30, at 383. Regarding the duty of magistrates, see R. v.
Pinney, [1832] 3 B. & Ad. 947.
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A system in which the police were answerable to justices would not have seemed
a system in which the police were constitutionally irresponsible. In the last
resort, the Commissioners could be dismissed." It is perhaps intentional that in
operational matters, the Secretary of State was not explicitly or implicitly given
the authority to direct police operations. If so, the practice of the Home Secre-
tary in answering Parliamentary questions would not be premised on any respon-
sibility imposed on him directly in respect of particular operational matters. He
would however be answerable for the proper operation of the force and could
no doubt be censured were he not to reprove or remove a Commissioner who
proved to be tyrannical, corrupt, or incompetent so as to be unable to control
his force properly.
The Police Act of 1964 does not deal with the exercise of police powers,
though it does contain features which could conduce to greater uniformity in
their exercise. Indeed, the Act sedulously fosters the independence of Chief
Constables. Thus the local police authority which is obliged to secure the main-
tenance of an adequate and efficient police force for its area has limited powers
to require information from the Chief Constable. An annual report is provided
by the Chief Constable and also such further reports as the police authority may
require in connection with policing. However, the Chief Constable may, if it
appears to him that material in the report requested ought not to be disclosed
in the public interest or is not needed for the functions of the police authority,
request the police authority to refer the requirement to the Home Secretary,
and ". .. in any such case the requirement... [is] of no effect until it is con-
firmed by the Secretary of State."3 " The relative weakness of the local police
authorities in these respects reflects that it was never intended that such authori-
ties should seek to control the police in the exercise of their functions. The
Police Act, by investing the Chief Constable with such responsibilities,3 res-
ponded to the very high value placed on the principle that the Chief Constable
should be free from the conventional processes of democratic control and in-
fluence in relation to operational matters.3"
The role of central government in setting standards is more important.
The powers of the Home Office are in part formal, and in part informal. There
is no doubt that the Home Office achieves much. There may be doubt about
whether it does enough in relation to enforcement matters. It is plain that gov-
ernmental attempts to tell the police how to proceed in particular cases would
be resented and could lead to abuse." In general operational matters influence
is now exercised, but could, no doubt, be exercised more extensively. The formal
powers of the Home Secretary include two which are of great importance. The
first is the power to make operational grants to local police authorities for
expenses incurred for public purposes. This, coupled with the power to appoint
35 Thus Sir Charles Warren was removed as Commissioner by Sir W. Harcourt, then Home
Secretary, following disputes between the two as to the appropriate methods for suppressing
public disorder.
36 Police Act 1964, c. 48, § 12(3).
37 Id. § 5(1).
38 CaND. No. 1728, paras. 89 et seq. (1962). See also 2 POLICE 15 (1970).




H. M. Inspectors of Constabulary to report to him on the efficiency of local
forces enables the Home Secretary to achieve his desired results in a wide range
of matters.' Even though the Inspectorate and indeed the Home Secretary
lack executive authority over particular forces, their role is dominant and
clearly perceived to be so throughout the police service. The Home Office has
on occasion pointed out that the Home Secretary and his officials perform a
wide variety of nonstatutory functions "with the objects of promoting uniformity
of purpose and professional ability and of providing means for the exchange
of ideas and police experience."'" Despite this fact, the Home Office avoids
instructing or attempting to instruct police forces concerning what laws they are
to enforce or how they are to do so. In matters of enforcement, the Home Office
does suggest certain procedures which it thinks ought to be followed. For
example, in relation both to interrogation and to lineups, Home Office circulars
describe how such activities ought to be conducted.2 In both cases, circulars,
drawn up with the advice of the Judges, list as their only explicit sanction for
nonobservance the possible inadmissibility at trial of evidence obtained in de-
fiance of the standards." In matters which may not involve the differential
enforcement of the law, such as ensuring that constables are instructed in matters
of race relations, the Home Office indicates what steps it thinks might appro-
priately be taken, but the ultimate responsibility is placed, as an operational
matter, within the jurisdiction of the Chief Constable.
There are valid constitutional reasons why the Home Office limits its
activities to those indicated above. For the Home Office to indicate which laws
ought to be enforced and which not, and the circumstances under which enforce-
ment might be eschewed, could bring it into conflict with certain provisions of
the Bill of Rights, which condemn the suspending power and provide "[t]hat
the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regall
authoritie [sic], as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegall [sic]."
The reference was to the assumed royal power to relieve particular offenders
from statutory penalties which they had incurred.4 It did not deprive the
Crown of the power to grant a pardon after conviction, or even, it has been
stated, before conviction, although of the latter case it has been said that "the
line between pardon before conviction and the unlawful exercise of dispensing
power is thin."" Equally, the line between permissible and impermissible non-
enforcement must be thin, and one which an executive department must be
40 See Sir I. Jacob, The Future of the Police, 1967 POLICE JOURNAL 309-320.
41 SELECT COMMITTEE ON RACE RELATIONS AND IMMIGRATION, Minutes of Evidence, Wed.
Dec. 1, 1971.
42 In relation to lineups, see Home Office Circular No. 9 (1969) and for interrogation,
see Home Office Circular No. 31 (1964).
43 And in some cases even this sanction is lacking. Thus under the Judges Rules (H. C).
Circular No. 31 1964), an arrested person is supposed to be allowed the use of a telephone to
contact his solicitor. Under English Law failure to allow him to do so does not of itself render
any statement which he may give inadmissible. For evidence of widespread police failure to
let persons use the telephone see Zander, Access to a Solicitor in the Police Station, 1972 CRIM.
L. REv. (Eng.) 342.
44 [1688] 1 W. & M., sess. 2 c.2.
45 F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 302-05 '(1908); 0.
HOOD PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADmINISTRATIVE LAw 45-46 (5th ed. 1965).
46 S.A. DR SMITH, supra note 30, at 128 n. 124.
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unwilling to tread upon." It may be noted that the same considerations appear
to underlie the position of those Chief Constables who question the propriety
of their exercising a large measure of discretion in determining not to prosecute
certain persons for particular offenses. It is generally conceded that a general
suspension of any law in favor of any section of the community is improper.
Police discretion, like executive discretion generally, must operate within the
constitutional limitations imposed by statute and the courts.
III. Police Discretion
The courts have seldom grappled with the problem of police discretion.
Cases abound in which courts have given an absolute discharge or awarded a
nominal penalty because they thought that a particular prosecution should never
have been brought.4 9 Affirmative guidance is less often ventured. The police
are under a general obligation to act fairly. It has been held that the police
ought not to arrest on a holding charge where there is insufficient evidence to
warrant their doing so."0 It has also been said that the police ought not to prefer
a lesser charge than the evidence warrants. Thus, in Re Beremsford, Devlin, J.,
states:
The police can never be criticised if the jury thinks it right to reduce the
charge, or even if the judge thinks it proper to withdraw it from the jury,
but they can be criticised if they usurp the function of the proper tribunal
by determining in advance what ought to be a triable issue. Similar con-
siderations apply to the two charges of dangerous driving and careless
driving. There are, I believe, too many cases where the justices are pre-
vented from dealing with dangerous driving as such because the police
have preferred the lesser charge."'
This is intelligible enough. It is, however, a conservative statement of the
boundaries of police discretion with which not all courts would agree. Some-
times, courts invite the police to exercise discretion in order to mitigate cases
where the infraction is minor and the applicable penalty disproportionate. Thus,
under the Road Safety Act 1967 it is an offense to drive when a stated level of
alcohol in the blood is exceeded. The penalty includes a mandatory disqualifica-
tion from driving. It has been held that even where the blood alcohol level is
exceeded only slightly, the court must disqualify. The court may not, but the
police should, apply a de minimis principle and refrain from prosecuting. 2
47 Indeed, the Home Secretary, who is directly responsible for the Metropolitan Police and
to whom the Commission of Metropolitan Police is directly responsible, insists that he does
not review the Commissioner's discretion in matters of enforcement. This, even conceding the
constitutional point, is surely remarkable.
48 See e.g. Williams, Turning a Blind Eye, 1954 Cms. L. RV. (Eng.) 271.
49 LoR DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROsEcUTION IN ENGLAND, 20 (1958).
50 Shaaban Bin Hussain v. Chong Fook Kam, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1626 (P.C.).
51 [1952] 36 Crim. App. 1.
52 R. v. Anderson, 1972 CRim. L. REv. (Eng.) 245; Delaroy-Hall v. Tadman, [1969]
2 W.L.R. 92 (1968).
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There are few statutory de minimis provisions in English law."3 Courts rely on
police discretion to fill the gap. Some of the difficulties are illustrated in the
recent case of R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Black-
burn2 The Commissioner, because of uncertainties in the Gaming Laws which
had not been resolved by judicial interpretation, determined, in the light of the
expense in money and manpower involved in keeping clubs under surveillance,
not to prosecute unless there were complaints of cheating or there was a reason
to suppose that a particular club had become a haven for criminals. The plain-
tiff moved for mandamus to require the Commissioner to enforce the Gaming
Laws." In respect of the central issue of discretion, Lord Denning, M. R., stated
that the Chief Constable, while independent in enforcement matters, is answer-
able to the law for the due performance of his duties. After having charted the
Chief Constable's independence from central or local government control in
operational matters, Lord Denning proceeded, in unclear fashion, to indicate
how discretion might properly be exercised. Thus, in particular cases, the Chief
Constable would have a say as to whether to proceed, and in what fashion.
He could make certain decisions in respect to general policy. For example, he
could determine not to prosecute cases of attempted suicide. On the other hand,
he could not decide to forbear from prosecuting all petty thieves. In this case,
his policy decision would be considered wrong. Salmon, L. J., who also addressed
himself to these issues, indicated that the police could decide not to prosecute
in particular cases, but did not successfully resolve the question when, in such
cases, forbearance was permissible. Thus, His Lordship distinguishes between
gaming cases and cases where the police decline to prosecute a youth for having
sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, on the ground that it is often the boy
who needs protection. 6 Gaming legislation is alleged to be different, as intended
to stop exploitation. Yet the purpose of both statutes is not fundamentally dis-
similar and the line adopted by the Commissioner was such as to provide for
prosecution in cases of dishonesty. Nor does Lord Denning's statement help
as much as might have been expected. It would appear that it clearly assumes
that the police cannot properly refuse to prosecute a criminal offense at all. It
is more defensible to draw a distinction between individual cases than between
classes of offenses." These considerations might justify the court in giving
guidance concerning enforcement policies to the police." It is questionable
53 For an example see Offences Against the Person Act 1861, §§ 44-45, where, if the
complainant proceeds against the assailant in a case of common assault via a prosecution, he
cannot thereafter bring a tort action.
54 [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 (C.A.). See also Williams, The Police and Law Enforcement, 1968
CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 351.
55 Much of the case is concerned with special features of mandamus, including locus standi
requirements. No account is given of these aspects here. See S. A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 569-74 (2d ed. 1968).
56 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, § 16 was referred to by the Court. Compare with
Sexual Offences Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 6 which indicates that a man under the
age of 24 who believes on reasonable grounds that the girl is over the age of 16 is not to be
convicted of the offense. Quaere whether this should not be exhaustive of leniency.
57 See SMITH & HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 237-38 (2d ed. 1969). Attempted suicide may
present a special problem. It is true that suicide was not considered to be a serious crime, that
attempted suicide may have been abolished, and that both suicide and attempted suicide were
in any event common law offenses.
58 Kirkland v. Cairns [1951] J.C. 61; Bego v. Gardner [1933] J.C. 23.
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whether the police could themselves properly decide not to enforce such offenses.
Again, in Buckoke v. Greater London Council" the court of appeal held that
an order given by the London Fire Service to its drivers instructing them to
cross on a red light if it were safe to do so was held to be lawful. Lord Denning,
M. R., referring to the Bill of Rights, nonetheless held that when the law had
become a dead letter the police need not prosecute, and further that the Com-
missioner of Police might make a policy decision in proper cases directing his
men not to prosecute. Such policy might direct that the police were not to pros-
ecute in cases where a fire engine driver crossed a red light in safety while an-
swering an emergency. That would be a justifiable policy decision to mitigate
the strict rigor of the law. If a constable did prosecute in such cases, the magi-
strate would be expected to give an absolute discharge. Thus by administrative
action, backed by judicial decision, an exception was grafted onto the law.
And indeed, a chief fire officer could instruct drivers to proceed through red
lights in answering an emergency, provided that they did so with care. It may
be noted that the court did, nonetheless, call for amending legislation to engraft
just such an exception into the traffic laws.
Buckoke's case looks like a signal application of common sense. It leaves
large problems in its wake. It recognizes that discretion will primarily be exer-
cised by the police and that this may ripen into an approved practice if sanc-
tioned by the courts. Plainly, discretion should not be exercised in cases where
it serves no purpose which the court would regard as redeeming. Yet this
leaves a large area of uncertainty. The general discretion premised, if it is to
be exercised in the first instance by the police, ought to be subject to some form
of review with the aims of setting standards and of ensuring justice in the partic-
ular case. Provision for this is made elsewhere, notably in some Commonwealth
Codes, but not in England.60 In England, administrative review outside the
police force itself is absent, and judicial review, at least in cases which are not
prosecuted, is a matter largely of chance.
The extent to which the problems are real is disclosed in police writings
on the subject.0 ' There is a general disinclination to prosecute trivial offenses.
Such prosecutions can appear tyrannical and are wasteful of time and energy
better employed elsewhere. Likewise, archaic offenses are not prosecuted.
Often age is treated as important. Young persons are frequently cautioned for
indictable offenses, though not all police officers are convinced that this is a
desirable course to take.62 Senility may well be taken into account in deter-
mining whether to prosecute an elderly person for shoplifting.
The bad health of a person accused of a minor offense may also be a proper
59 [1971] 2 All E.R. 254.
60 See INDIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and SUDAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
under which if the police refuse to prosecute in noncognizable cases, the victim, if any, may
apply to the magistrates to require the police to show cause why the offense should not be
prosecuted.
61 Wilcox, The Use of Discretion in Enforcing the Law, 42 MEDICo-LEo. J. 3 (1972);
Williams, Turning a Blind Eye, 1954 CRIm. L. REv. (Eng.) 271; Clissett, The Exercise of Di&
cretion in the Enforcement of Law, 42 POLICE JOURNAL 564 (1969).




consideration. Furthermore, the circumstances of the offender are sometimes
taken into account. Thus, it has been said that while back-street abortionists
should be prosecuted, ".... nothing is achieved by bringing before a criminal
court a young woman in lodgings who, in lonely desperation, has attempted
to terminate her own pregnancy.""es The facts that a regulation governing a
trade or business has newly come into force, and the people thereby affected
have not had sufficient opportunity to adjust, may also be taken into account.
Moreover, there is a disinclination often felt to prosecute some cases of domestic
assaults. In the case of "Peeping Toms" who commit no substantive offense
but who are sometimes bound over, there is a marked variation in the procedures
adopted by the police.
Some of these criteria would meet with universal assent. Others, especially
with regard to youth or to those invidious class distinctions readily concealed
within the disposition of domestic assaults, would not." There is much discre-
tion involved in deciding whether an offense is trivial, or whether the interest
to be served by a prosecution ought to predominate over factors conducive to
leniency. Rigid and detailed rules of conduct are no answer;6" neither is un-
regulated discretion. The area is, after all, normative. It must be said at once
that problems are well known to senior police officers, and that in guiding the
constables under their command a real attempt is made to determine what the
appropriate public policy is. An example can be seen in the reluctance of the
police to prosecute for offenses committed by a truant from an approved school,
where the charge of escape itself is dealt with by the manager of the school with
the approval of the Home Secretary.6
It is important to recognize that the problem of discretion arises at different
levels, of which the decision whether or not to invoke the criminal process is
only one. In England the police may simply decide not to proceed formally.
In many cases, particularly traffic cases, the constable may simply advise and
warn the offender. In cases where a simple warning is considered too lenient,
the police may issue a formal caution. A caution is issued when prosecution is
deemed inappropriate. It is a formal, recorded procedure, albeit one which is
provided for neither by statute nor at common law. The caution is either an oral
warning delivered by a senior police officer in uniform or, in the unusual case,
a letter which is sent to a person who has been reported by a police constable to
his superiors for an offense. It informs the person to whom it is addressed that
he has been reported for an offense, that it is not intended to prosecute him, but
that if he is again reported for an offense, the circumstances in which the caution
63 Wilcox, supra note 61, at 7.
64 The problem is analogous to the view of police in some American jurisdictions that
assault is an acceptable means of settling disputes among Negroes. See Goldstein, Police Dis-
cretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of
Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
65 Wilcox, supra note 61. See also, Wilcox, Police Cautions in Five Towns, 1971 CRm.
L. REV. (Eng.) 515, a review of a booklet of the same title by David Steer. Wilcox indeed
argues, or appears to argue, for flexibility without review, concluding that the police are best
able to make decisions in such cases.
66 See J. D. DEVLIN, POLICE CHARGES 77 (3d ed. 1968).
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was issued will be taken into account.0 7 In general, it may be said that cautions
are issued only when the police feel that they have enough evidence to proceed
to trial. The Metropolitan Police adhere strictly to this view. In other police
forces, cautions are occasionally issued where the offender did not admit the
offense and where the police had insufficient evidence to prosecute. In the latter
case the caution is said to be as to the offender's future conduct.""
The reasons why cautions are issued in lieu of prosecution have been dealt
with by Mr. Steer. These are summarized as follows: (1) complainant declined
to prosecute; (2) victim a voluntary participant; (3) evidence insufficient;
(4) offender's circumstances; (5) other reasons-which included some trivial
cases, cases in which persons sought to use the criminal law for debt collection,
or to fix paternity.69 It will be noticed that the same criteria might have de-
termined whether any action was to be taken at all. Apart from cases of in-
sufficiency of evidence, the police issue a caution when a decision is taken not to
prosecute. For practical purposes, the decision not to proceed and the decision
to caution may be conflated.
The extent to which police discretion is involved in cautioning appears in
Mr. Steer's work (Police Cautions: A Study in the Exercise of Police Discretion),
in the Criminal Statistics, and in the Reports of H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary.
In 1970 43,520 males and 12,166 females were cautioned for indictable offenses.
Furthermore, 22,663 males and 7,103 females were cautioned for nonindictable
offenses other than motoring offenses. The figure for females includes 4,153
females cautioned for loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution."
Mr. Steer finds, and the Criminal Statistics amply confirm, that greater leniency
is shown to juveniles and to female offenders.71 Thus, in 1970 only 4,084 males
over 21 were cautioned for indictable offenses compared with a global total of
148,079 males aged 21 or over who were found guilty or cautioned. If, by con-
trast, one studies the figures for males between 14 and 17 years of age, it will be
found that 14,317 were cautioned and that 59,473 were found guilty or cau-
tioned. With women over 21 years of age, 3,258 were cautioned for indictable
offenses, while 30,838 were found guilty or cautioned. The relevance of age and
sex is thus apparent."2 In motoring cases, cautioning is widely used. In 1970,
the Metropolitan Police issued 21,948 cautions and 285,764 verbal warnings."
67 A form of caution is reproduced as an appendix to D. STEER, POLICE CAUTIoNs: A
STUDY IN THE ExERCISE OF POLICE DISCRETION (Oxford 1970).
68 Id. at 34-35.
69 Id. at 26 et seq.
70 CRIMINAL STATISTICS, (B. & W.) 1970. The caution in relation to offenses of prosti-
tution is sui generis. Before a woman can be charged with soliciting for the purposes of prosti-
tution it is considered desirable that she should twice have been cautioned. The caution pro-
cedure is extra-statutory, but there is provision in the Street Offences Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2,
c. 57, § 2, for a woman to apply to have a caution expunged. For further details see 598
PARL. DEE. H. C. (5th ser.) cols. 1272 et seq.
71 D. STEER, supra note 67, at 5-8, where it is suggested that one reason for the phenom-
enon may be that women and juveniles tend to commit less serious offenses. In addition in the
case of juveniles there is the hope that by not treating the juvenile as a delinquent, he may in
future be turned from delinquency.
72 CRIMINAL STATISTICS (E. & W.), Tables 24 and 25 (1970).
73 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS at 49 et seq. (1970).
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Similar figures exist for the country at large, and the picture has remained the
same for some years. 4
One of the problems in this area is, however, a lack of uniformity in police
practice. 5 Under recent legislation dealing with children, the desirability of a
police caution has been recognized, and it is predictable that this will have an
effect upon police policy. Many police forces have operated juvenile liaison
schemes for some time, and this practice has likewise affected policy in some
areas. Such schemes are apparently more widespread in the north of England. 7
The extent to which cautions are used can vary markedly in juvenile cases be-
tween different police areas, reflecting the ideological preconceptions of Chief
Constables. It can indeed, lead to quite severe swings in policy." Even in rela-
tion to road traffic where the caution is a universally accepted device, it has
been pointed out that "unfortunately there is a considerable divergence of policy
as between one police force and another."79 The Metropolitan Police have
adopted fairly clear policies in this area. Cautions are often used in minor cases,
but only rarely in cases of speeding, dangerous and careless driving, failing to
conform to automatic light signals, and defective and dangerous vehicles.' Such
clarity of policy does not seem to be universal. Unfortunately, no studies appear
to have been carried out regarding cautioning policy in road traffic cases, and
the extent to which there is a problem remains obscure. However, in the case
of adult offenders in indictable cases, there does appear to be a considerable uni-
formity as between different police forces.
Cautioning is not the only area in which discretion is exercised. Once it
has been decided to invoke the criminal process, the question then arises as to
how this is to be done. Basically, the police may either arrest the person, obtain
a summons to require him to attend court, or, in some cases, procure a warrant
for his arrest. In cases involving firearms, drugs, or the illegal possession of
certain wild bird eggs (a somewhat heterogeneous list), police may be able to
exercise statutory powers to stop and search before determining to proceed
farther.8 ' In many areas where private and local Acts of Parliament apply,
power may exist to stop, to search, and to detain persons and conveyances where
it is suspected that stolen goods may be found on the person or in the con-
veyance.82 The dangers in stop-and-search legislation are well known. The
police may stop and search not because they have probable cause to do so, but
because they are reacting in an authoritarian fashion to long hair, strange dress,
74 See e.g., the REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS for
1960 and 1970. No substantial variation is disclosed, although the global number of traffic
offenses has plainly grown as motor vehicle ownership has become more widespread.
75 D. STEER, supra note 67, at 14-15, presents tables which illustrate the divergences in
policy quite graphically.
76 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, c. 54, § 5.
77 D. STEER, supra note 67, at 7.
78 Id. at 17.
79 REPORT OF H. M. CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY 53 (1964).
80 REPORT OF THE COMaMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS 80-81 (1959-60).
81 Firearms Act 1968, c. 27, § 47; Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, c. 38, § 23(2); Protection
of Birds Act 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 30, § 12(1).
82 See e.g., Metropolitan Police Act 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 47, § 66. In POWERS oF ARREST
AND SEARCH IN RELATION TO DRUG OFFENCES (H.M.S.O. 1970) para. 18 n. 1, twelve locali-
ties are identified in which such powers exist.
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beads, and the like. This complaint has been voiced in relation to police powers
in the field of drugs.s Certain figures have been published in relation to drug
matters, but it is difficult to assess these."' A ratio of arrests to stops of two in
seven or one in six was considered to be reasonable by the majority of a Drug
Advisory Committee which studied the matter. The conclusion is one with which
it is difficult either to quarrel, or assent to. The approach taken by the Commit-
tee was to compare the result of police successes and failures under other statutory
powers with those under drug legislation." The method may be thought to be
somewhat inexact. The principal interest of the Report for the purposes of this
article lies, however, in the indications of the dangers to personal liberty involved
in stop-and-search powers and the types of administrative direction which the
Committee considered ought to be given to the police.
Even the decision whether to arrest or to make application for summons
may involve discretion. In such cases, there is a natural tendency for the police
to arrest the suspect. In order to obtain a summons, application must be made to
a justice of the peace." Arrest without warrant involves no such step. From the
police point of view it is therefore an administratively convenient method. In
Metropolitan London where extensive powers of arrest are conferred on the
police under the Metropolitan Police Act, arrest is used in virtually all indictable
offensesYs7 In the country at large, some use is made of the summons in indictable
offenses. There is data which suggests that the use of the summons in such cases
is declining. 8 The reasons for this are obscure. The figures may reflect the fact
that along with the process of substantive law reform has gone an extension of
offenses for which the police may arrest without warrant, but this seems un-
likely." There seems to have been a slight but perceptible shift in police practices.
Whatever be the reasons for the increased use of arrest and decreased use of
83 0. COON & R. HARRIS, THE RELEASE REPORT ON DRUG OFFENDERS AND THE LAw
(1969).
84 POWERS OF ARREST AND SEARCH IN RELATION TO DRUG OFFENCES supra note 82, at
paras. 55 and 119.
85 Id. at para. 119.
86 Magistrates Courts Act 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 1.
87 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS 46 (1947). The
practice has remained unaltered.
88 In 1964 the percentage of persons summoned expressed as a percentage of the total
of those apprehended and summoned in indictable cases stood at 40 per cent. In 1969, the
figure was 36 per cent, and in 1970 35 per cent. See CRIMINAL STATISTICS (E. & W.) Table
10. Again, age and sex had an influence in determining whether the summons was used.
Seemingly the ratio of summons to arrest was most favorable in the case of juveniles and
female offenders. The figures herein are crude and much further research is needed. There
does however seem to be a constant trend over all age groups and certainly in relation to class
III offenses--those committed against property without violence. The author is grateful
to Mr. T. C. Smith, LL.B., one of his graduate students, for bringing the phenomenon to his
attention. A. K. Bottomley, Prison Before Trial, (London School of Economics Occasional
Papers in Soc. Adm. No. 39) notes that the summons is more often used in rural courts and
may have an effect on the outcome of a particular case. A person who appears on summons
rather than arrest has for example a better chance of securing bail pending trial. He will
probably keep his job. He may be less likely ultimately to face a prison sentence.
89 By Criminal Law Act 1967, an arrestable offense is defined as one in respect of which
there is a maximum penalty of five years or more imprisonment. Under the Theft Act 1968
c. 60, most offenses now are punishable by a maximum sentence of five years, and joyriding
which under § 12 has a three-year maximum, is expressly made an arrestable offense. Most
of the common offenses against property involving dishonesty were, however, formerly arrest-
able, especially theft and false pretenses.
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summons, the development is one which again poses problems. Arrest is embar-
rassing. It may not be only inconvenient to the person arrested, but also gravely
damaging. This has long been recognized in relation to the manner of arrest,"0
and should be recognized in relation to the fact of arrest. Furthermore, the deten-
tion which can follow arrest may, as is now recognized, prove detrimental in
many ways to the person arrested. He may lose his job. He may find it more
difficult to mount his defense.9 Undoubtedly the situation is reasonably healthy
in England as compared to other foreign jurisdictions. Apart from driving
offenses involving drink or drugs, driving offenses are usually dealt with by sum-
mons. Most summary offenses are dealt with by summons rather than arrest.
Furthermore, where an arrest is made, for whatever offense, the police, if the
offense be not in their view serious, may bail the offender themselves. This in-
volves entering into a recognizance and not the deposit of cash.92 It is not known
what percentage of arrested persons are in fact bailed by the police. A recent
study, involving small areas and a relatively small number of offenders, found
that about 18 per cent were bailed in rural, and 11 per cent in urban areas.93
Metropolitan Police officers have suggested that in fact these figures are low and
therefore atypical. Be that as it may, the use of arrest is a practice which must
be watched. Certainly, there appear to be no directions to the police telling them
when to arrest and when to summons. The natural inference would be that
arrest is to be used in any case where the power exists. If this is so, then there
is a need at least for administrative directions to ensure that arrest is not an
automatic response in cases where there is no imperative need that it should be.
In this respect, recently enacted Canadian legislation might be considered.94
A further, and poorly documented area of discretion, relates to the choice of
charge to be brought. The selection of the charge and the decision to oppose
summary trial are again matters of police discretion.95 Criticism of the police as
a rule centers on the view that the charge brought was too lenient.99 A person
charged with obstruction will, it has been said, often have committed a far more
serious offense, sometimes amounting to an assault or wounding. Two principal
reasons have been advanced for the practice of preferring lesser charges. On the
one hand, proceedings may in such cases be more certain and speedy. At the
90 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE para. 84
(1929).
91 A. K Bottomley, supra note 88, at 31-39. See also M. FRIEDLAND, DETENTION BEFORE
TRIAL (1965) regarding Canada, and E. PUTTKAMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
68-70 (1953) for remarks on the American scene.
92 Magistrates Courts Act 1952 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 38(1).
93 A. K. Bottomley, supra note 88, at 64.
94 Bail Reform Act 1971 § 450(2) imposes a duty on the police not to arrest in summary
conviction cases and in respect of lesser indictable offenses where the public interest, including
the need to identify the person or to secure or preserve evidence of the offense or to prevent
a repetition of -the offense, may be satisfied without arrest particularly where the constable
has no reason to believe that the person will not appear to stand his trial. For commentaries
see C. POWELL, ARREST AND BAIL IN CANADA (Toronto 1972) and McWilliams, Reform of
Bail, 19 CHITTY'S LAW JOURNAL 234 (1971). For the genesis of the Canadian legislation,
see REPORT OF THE CANADIAN COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS 93-97 (1964). It may be of
interest to note that in France, the Police judiciare are empowered to arrest only in case of
crime or delit flagrant. See G. LEVASSEUR & A. CHAVANNE, DROIT PENAL ET PROCEDURE
PENALE paras. 20 and 321 (2d ed. 1972).
95 Hargrove, Police Discretion, 25 SOL. 337 (1958).
96 Re Beresford, (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 1.
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other extreme, the choice may reflect a bargain between the accused's solicitor
and the police to drop the greater charge and accept a lesser one, with perhaps an
understanding as to the giving of information to the police.9" The importance
of the criteria of certainty and speed in setting the charge can readily be docu-
mented. A standard police work thus notes that where there is a choice between
charging the offense of occasioning actual bodily harm95 or the graver charges
of wounding or causing grievous bodily harm,99 the actual bodily harm charge
should be chosen because it is more easily proved. Similarly, the police do not
usually charge persons with the common law offense of indecent exposure because
the charge is one which is triable only on indictment. Instead, where possible, the
police charge indecent exposure with intent to insult a female contrary to section
4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. This summary charge carries a maximum penalty
of £25.00 or three months' imprisonment. In the alternative, a charge with a
rather lower penalty of indecent exposure to the annoyance of residents, contrary
to section 28 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 may be used."'
It is not argued that the bringing of a lesser charge for technical reasons of
the sort outlined above is undesirable or corrupt. In the instances cited it would
'probably matter little in terms of the ultimate sentence which of the charges was
brought. The matter of preferring lesser charges as a result of a bargain poses
greater difficulty. The gravity with which conduct is to be viewed is, as the
result of such a practice, determined primarily by the police. This is decidedly
paradoxical in an English context because of the very tight control exercised by
the courts over the practice of plea bargaining. English courts do not treat
themselves as bound, in the matter of sentence, by any bargain struck between
prosecution and defense, nor will the court take part in the bargaining process.
The most that the court will do is to indicate the type of penalty which it regards
as prima facie appropriate to the case.' 0 Thus, judicial control over the sentenc-
ing process is rigidly maintained. Yet the system may be undermined by the
willingness of the police to proceed summarily, and such decision is only im-
perfectly reviewable.'
2
97 Hargrove, supra note 95.
98 Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, § 47.
99 Id. §§ 18 and 20. For details of these offenses see SMITH and HOGAN, CRaIMINAL LAW
264-68 (2d ed. 1969).
100 J. D. DEviN, supra note 66, at 53, 131-32.
101 R. v. Turner, [1970] 2 All E.R. 281; and see Davis, Sentences for Sale: A New Look
at Plea Bargaining in England and America, 1971 CRIer. L. REv. (Eng.) 150; Gordon, Plea
Bargaining, 1970 S.L.T. NEws 153; 1970 ANN. SURVEY OF COMMONWEALTH LAw 173-74.
102 If after convicting a person not below the age of seventeen of an indictable offense,
a Magistrates Court is of opinion that the offender's character and antecedents are such
that greater punishment should be inflicted upon him than the court has power to inflict,
the court may commit him to Quarter Sessions for sentence. Criminal Justice Act 1948,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58 § 29; Magistrates Courts Act 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2,
c. 55, § 29; Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 56. The matter of sentence may have been
effectively compromised by an initial decision -to bring proceedings summarily rather than on
indictment. However, in R. v. Coe [1968] 53 Cr. App. R. 66 the court disapproved of the
prosecution's bringing charges summarily where the offenses were serious. The court further
points out that the magistrates' primary duty in indictable cases is to begin to inquire into
the matter as examining justices and only to try the case summarily where, under the cir-
cumstances, their sentencing powers seem adequate. See Magistrates Courts Act 1952, 15 &
16 Geo. 6 & Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 19(2).
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IV. Conclusion: The Proper Role of the Police
The areas with which we have dealt represent the main areas in which the
police in England and Wales exercise discretion. They are, to borrow a phrase,
"low-visibility" areas."o The problem of control is one of some difficulty. The
first and most obvious point to be suggested is that there has been a failure to
articulate standards which the police might apply. There is truth in the assertion
that an unduly rigid code of rules would work badly.' 4 Even conceding this,
the statement of some customary platitudes might be of service to the con-
stable in determining whether to exercise powers in a particular case. The dif-
ferential nature of enforcement reveals that criteria are now imposed within
police forces by the Chief Constable. These necessarily relate to both the criteria
by which discretion is exercised and to the consistency with which it is exer-
cised.'0° To externalize some of these criteria is surely not unthinkable, nor
would it be unworkable. Thus, for example, it could be determined whether
cautions ought ever to be issued in cases where guilt is not admitted and the
police lack evidence upon which to prosecute. This would bring uniformity of
practice between the Metropolitan Police and other forces. It would be helpful
to indicate in certain circumstances whether a caution was appropriate or not;
as for example in cases where the suspect appeared not to have committed a
crime at all. One such circumstance mentioned by Mr. Steer is the case wherein
a juvenile who might have a statutory defense to a charge of unlawful sexual
intercourse is nonetheless cautioned.' ° The lead given in Canadian legislation
regarding when not to arrest has already been noted and affords a drafting
model. More broadly, there is the example of Scotland where the criteria em-
ployed in determining whether to bring a charge have been reduced to writing,
albeit in an exceedingly general form.' Even general ethical criteria, doubtless
of a negative nature, might be formulated to give some guidance on the question
when a more or less serious charge should be brought.
The conditions upon which the criminal law ought not to be exercised is as
much a matter of concern for society at large as the question when the criminal
law should be invoked. The criteria by which the police act are not all of self-
evident validity. They concern us all. There may of course be other reasons why
some persons do not desire greater articulation of these matters. There might be
a fear for example that persons would seek to set up rights to a caution and, ulti-
mately, to judicialize the use of discretion to a point where its existence would be
burdensome to enforcement agencies. These problems, given the present grace
103 Goldstein, supra note 64.
104 Wilcox, supra note 61.
105 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 19 (1967).
106 D. STEER, supra note 67, at 57-58. Mr. Steer favors the use of a caution in some
cases where the police are technically able to proceed, remarking that ". . . it seems quite
sensible that he should be warned that such behaviour is likely to be misunderstood and that
he is treading in the borderland of crime." The caution should not however thereafter be
referred to. Seemingly, such references have been made in social inquiry reports, a practice
which Mr. Steer rightly condemns.
107 See RENTON & BROWN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14 (3d ed. 1968) where the principles
are set out, albeit without attribution of authority.
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and favor approach, scarcely exist. This is a danger which it may simply be
preferable to face.
If one assumes that the relevant criteria can be and have been articulated,
the next step is to see how the due observance of. these might best be secured.
'The first and most critical link in the chain lies in the hierarchical control within
the force itself. In England this is a shared matter in that the code of discipline
is propounded by the Home Office, but enforced by the Chief Constable." 8 In
operational matters the Chief Constable is of course supreme. In a real sense
responsibility is shared because as we have seen, the Home Secretary has a voice
in deciding who may be appointed Chief Constable and who may be removed
from that office, if necessary. But these are ultimate weapons. It is upon the
intelligence and integrity of the Chief Constable that the proper performance of
police duties primarily depends. The problem is to see how the Chief Constable
may be guided and if necessary corrected without proceeding to extreme, dis-
ciplinary measures, which would probably be destructive and unnecessary.
Various methods of reconciling the competing demands of independence
and control have been suggested. Of these, the most prominent, and to American
eyes the most familiar, is to make the police answerable to a central body of
prosecutors. Thus, Justice""8 has recommended that there should be established
a Department of Public Prosecutions to be responsible both for the decision to
prosecute and for the conduct of prosecutions. The Department would not
handle trivial and routine cases, nor would it deal with cases presently prosecuted
by other government departments. The Department, unlike the present police
solicitors, would be independent of the police, and would be headed by a director
who would be responsible to the Attorney General for his actions. The Attorney
General would be responsible to Parliament for the conduct of the Department.
The justification for the scheme is said to be that the officers of such a Depart-
ment would be better able to take a detached view of cases than the police, and
would be better able to weigh objectively the factors which should properly be
taken into account in determining whether to prosecute. The proposal also seeks
to overcome the present regional variations in prosecution policy which are said
to derive from the differing attitudes of Chief Constables. This advantage might
accrue. It may however be thought to be potentially rigid, workable only under
conditions of extreme centralization or detailed rules capable of rigid enforce-
ment. If the scheme allowed for flexibility and decentralization one might gain
neither detachment, because the solicitors would necessarily be familiar with
locally based police, nor any greater consistency than at present, since the views
of locally based prosecutors might be given full expression.1" At the least, the
problem of control within the new hierarchy needs to be more carefully con-
sidered. Furthermore, the question of who is to set the standards to be applied,
even in a general form, needs to be solved. A variation on the theme suggests
the formation of a National Legal Department to which the police could go to
108 See 1967 S.I. No. 185, 186.
109 The Prosecution Process in England and Wales, JUSTICE (London, 1970).




obtain legal representation and advice.'1" This idea may be thought to be in-
sufficiently coercive, though the ability of the Department to take over any
prosecution as of right would impose some safeguards against unregulated police
discretion.
In all these schemes, there is the problem of achieving not only control
within the hierarchy but control outside it."1 The availability of parliamentary
control, doubtless via a Select Committee, is one of the most attractive features
of the Justice scheme." 3 One might perhaps enter a plea for judicial control as
well, to suit the exigencies of the particular case. Justice, to a point, recognizes
the problem by providing for the continued existence of the private prosecution.
The private prosecution is not, however, an efficient device for controlling dis-
cretion, nor is it always a realistic weapon to proffer to a victim anxious to
employ the criminal law to vindicate a wrong done to him. Perhaps, assuming
the existence of agreed standards, we might follow those Commonwealth
countries which allow a summary application to a magistrate to have prosecuto-
rial discretion reviewed." 4
At the moment, such schemes as these are a topic of discussion, but not, it
would seem, of governmental action. England remains a jurisdiction which, re-
markably, vests enormous discretionary powers in the police, and in which, even
more remarkably, control is left almost entirely to the invisible processes of advice
and consultation.
111 The Prosecution Process in England and Wales, supra note 109, at 15 (minority report
by Laurance Crossley).
112 A problem adverted to in relation to American prosecutors by Silkenat, Limitations
on Prosecutors' Discretionary Power to Initiate Criminal Suits: Movement Toward a New
Era, 5 OTTAWA L. REv. 104 (1971).
113 This might avoid the problem that prosecutorial discretion would still be unreviewable,
as it appears to be, for example, in Scotland. See G. H. GoRDoN, CRIMINAL LAW 4-5 (Edin-
burgh 1967).
114 See Laws of the Sudan, Vol. 9 Title XXV Criminal Procedure, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, §§ 111(1), 135 and Schedule 1, col. 3; CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (India)
(Act V of 1898) §§ 154 and 157. See D. V. CHITALEY & S. AFpu RAo, 1 THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 862 (1965) where it is pointed out that the police do not have an
unrestricted discretion not to investigate a complaint, but can refuse to do so only in Cases
where no prima facie case for investigation has been made out, or where the report appears
to be false or the dispute is of a civil nature.
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